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I. INTRODUCTIONM assive termination of Social Security disability benefits has stirred
considerable controversy over the procedure employed to separate
wrongfully-terminated, deserving recipients from malingerers. After
meeting the statutory definition of "disability,"' most recipients are not
automatically granted continuous benefits. Rather, the Social Security
Administration (SSA) undertakes periodic investigations to determine
whether recipients continue to remain eligible for disability
compensation.2
I The statutory definition of "disability" for Social Security purposes is set forth as
follows in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A)(1982): "Inability to engage in any substantial gainful
activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can
be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months."
2 The Social Security Administration is an agency within the Department of Health
and Human Services. The agency's regulations governing Federal Old Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance Benefits, and Supplemental Security Income for the Aged, Blind and
Disabled are codified in 20 C.F.R. pts. 404 and 416 (1984). The sections that cover the
decision whether to continue disability benefits are found in 20 C.FR §§ 404.1588-.1598
(1984). Section 404.1589 specifically provides:
After we find that you are disabled, we must determine from time to time if you
are still eligible for disability cash benefits. We may begin an investigation for this
purpose for any number of reasons, including your failure to follow the provisions
of the Social Security Act or these regulations. If our investigation shows that we
should suspend payment of your benefits, we will notify you in writing and give
you an opportunity to reply. In Section 404.1590 we describe those events that may
prompt us to investigate whether you continue to be disabled.
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If after review the recipient is deemed no longer disabled, this termina-
tion decision may be challenged. Disputes concerning appropriate pro-
cedures used in the appeals process led to the implementation of an
evidentiary hearing at the reconsideration level.3 Should the unfavorable 4
decision be upheld, the recipient may then request a formal hearing be-
fore an Administrative Law Judge (AI,).! If necessary, the final admin-
istrative remedy, a request for review by the Appeals Council, may be
exercised.6 The SSA is an agency governed by the Department of Health
and Human Services; consequently, a decree of the Appeals Council rep-
resents the final decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(Secretary) concerning a disability claim. If a claimant remains dissatis-
fied with that determination, judicial review of the Secretary's decision
may be commenced in a United States District Court.'
3 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(2)(1982) provides:
(2) In any case where-
(A) an individual is a recipient of disability insurance benefits, or of child's,
widow's, or widower's insurance benefits based on disability,
(B) the physical or mental impairment on the basis of which such benefits are
payable is found to have ceased, not to have existed, or to no longer be disab-
ling, and
(C) as a consequence of the finding described in subparagraph (B), such indi-
vidual is determined by the Secretary not to be entitled to such benefits,
any reconsideration ... shall be made only after opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing, with regard to the finding described in subparagraph (B), which is rea-
sonably accessible to such individuals.., the evidentiary hearing shall be held by
an adjudicatory unit of the State agency other than the unit that made the finding
described in subparagraph (B).
4 This expression refers to the termination decision which is, in effect, unfavorable to
the claimant. A favorable decision is one granting or continuing an individual's benefits.
The terms "termination," "cessation," and "unfavorable decision" will be used interchange-
ably throughout the text.
5 Hearings, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929-.965 (1984). The claimant is provided with an oppor-
tunity to appear in person, submit new evidence, examine the evidence used in the decision
under review, and question and present witnesses. An AUJ will conduct such proceedings
and issue a decision based on the record.
6 Appeals Council Reviews, 20 C.FR. §§ 404.967-.981 (1984). The role of the Appeals
Council is defined in these regulations. Specifically, § 404.979 permits the Appeals Council
to affirm, modify or reverse the hearing decision made by the A.J. The Council is also given
authority to adopt, modify, or reject a recommended decision, as well as remand a case back
to the AW.
7 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g)(West 1983) provides the following:
Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a hearing to
which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the
mailing to him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the
Secretary may allow. Such action shall be brought in the district court of the
United States for the judicial district in which the plaintiff resides or has his
principal place of business, or, if he does not reside or have his principal place of
business within any such judicial district, in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia.
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Procedural questions concerning terminations were settled by a 1982
Amendment to the Social Security Act8 that mandated face-to-face recon-
sideration hearings. Problems remained, however, regarding which party
bore the burden of proof in presenting evidence of continued disability.
Initial disability determinations were generally based on a compilation of
hospital records, physicians' reports, and testimony which indicated that
the claimant was disabled. Conflicts centered on which party was respon-
sible for furnishing similar evidence when continued disability was de-
nied. An even greater dispute concerned the standard of review employed
to terminate disability benefits. Since 1977, the Secretary had terminated
benefits on the basis of whether new or current medical evidence obtained
for review indicated disability. This was done without regard for the prior
determination that the claimant was disabled.9 Benefit recipients and
their counsel, however, advocated the adoption of a medical improvement
standard in which disability benefits continued as long as the claimant's
condition had not medically improved. The litigation prompted by this
dispute resulted in rulings by a majority of the federal circuit courts that
disability benefits cannot be terminated without a showing that a dis-
abled person had medically improved.10 These decisions culminated in the
inclusion of a medical improvement standard for review of possible termi-
nation cases in the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984
signed into law on October 9, 1984.11
Although this Note will briefly outline the administrative process fol-
lowed in evaluating continuing disability, its primary focus will be on the
newly-enacted medical improvement standard. Specifically, decisions giv-
ing rise to the standard will be reviewed with an examination of the
courts' rationales for adopting such a standard. The text of the 1984
Amendment will then be compared to case law to determine whether it
reflects any of the courts' reasons for adoption. Possible interpretations
and potential problems will be pointed out. Finally, the standard's future
impact on disability recipients will be discussed.
Thus, as long as the action is timely commenced, the district court has jurisdiction to
review the matter. This court cannot review the evidence de novo; rather, review is limited to
determining whether the Secretary's final decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139 (6th Cir. 1980); Futernick v. Richardson, 485 F.2d 647 (6th Cir.
1973).
, See supra note 3.
9 Social Security Administration Final Rules, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,568 (1980)(to be codified
at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1579, 404.1586, 404.1594, and 416.994).
10 The Social Security Scandals, Newsweek, Sept. 24, 1984, at 32. The article focused
on the plight of several individuals currently involved in disability appeals, emphasizing the
delays in agency action and payment of benefits after entitlement was re-established.
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395(f)(1982) for the statutory standard of review for termination of
disability benefits. See Part IV of this note for a summarized version of the medical improve-
ment standard.
1985-86] 147
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II. OVERVIEW OF THE DISABILITY TERMINATION PROCEDURE USED IN
MONITORING CLAIMS OF CONTINUED DISABILITY
The Social Security disability program provides for joint administra-
tion between the states and the federal government, which acts through
the Secretary and the SSA. Any state may enter into an agreement with
the Secretary under which a state agency will make disability determina-
tions with respect to individuals in that staten with such determinations
being treated as decisions of the Secretary. 3 Should a state fail or be
unwilling to make disability determinations, the Secretary will assume
this function.
4
Disability claimants initially file their applications and any evidence
supporting their position in a Social Security district or branch office; the
file is then transferred to a state agency for further investigation and
medical evaluation.'5 Based on the agency's inquiry, a recommendation
for allowance or disallowance of the claim will be made. 16 If the claim is
denied, the individual may request a reconsideration of the decision.
17
Should the claim be denied again, the claimant may return to his or her
local Social Security office and request a face-to-face hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge. In most cases, this hearing is the first time
that the applicant is actually seen by the party responsible for making
12 42 U.S.C.S. § 421(a)(1)(Law. Co-op. 1973), which provides:
In the case of any individual, the determination of whether or not he is under a
disability... shall be made by a State agency, notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of law, in any state that notifies the Secretary in writing that it wishes to
make such disability determinations commencing with such month as the Secre-
tary and the State agree upon, but only if (A) the Secretary has not found, under
subsection (b)(1), that the State agency has substantially failed to make disability
determinations in accordance with the applicable provisions of this section or
rules issued thereunder, and (B) the State has not notified the Secretary, under
subsection (b)(2), that it does not wish to make such determinations. If the Secre-
tary once makes the finding described in clause (A) of the preceding sentence, or
the State gives the notice referred to in clause (B) of such sentence, the Secretary
may thereafter determine whether (and, if so, beginning in the month and under
what conditions) the State may again make disability determinations under this
paragraph.
a The state agency acts for the local SSA office, which is governed by the Department
of Health and Human Services. Thus, the state disability determinations are ultimately
treated as those of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
14 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 421(b) (Law. Co-op. 1973).
15 H. MCCORMICK, SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIMS AND PROCEDURES, § 12, at 17 (3d ed.
1983)[hereinafter cited as H, MCCORMICKI. Disability determinations by the state agency
are made by an evaluation team composed of a physician and a lay specialist.
16 Id. at 17-18. If the claim is allowed, benefits are certified for payment.
17 Id. at 18. The individual will file a formal request for reconsideration with the local
Social Security office. New evidence concerning the claimant's condition may be filed at this
time. The claim is then reviewed again.
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/13
1985-86] MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT STANDARD 149
the disability determination."' Upon receiving an unfavorable decision
from the AUJ, both the applicant and the SSA may request review by the
Appeals Council; an appeal to a federal district court may be taken after
administrative remedies have been exhausted.19
After the Secretary has determined that an individual is disabled and
benefits have been awarded, the agency regulations provide for periodic
reviews to determine whether recipients continue to meet the statutory
definition of disability.20 This provision for re-evaluation was prompted by
a dramatic increase in the disability incidence rate between 1968 and
1975, with an accompanying decrease in disability termination rates dur-
ing the same period.21 This increase in the number of disability benefit
recipients was attributed to the following: a) healthy beneficiaries con-
tinuing to receive benefits,22 b) administrative changes in determination
of a beneficiary's improved condition, 23 and c) the belief that high benefits
levels encouraged healthy individuals to remain on the rolls.24
18 Id. McCormick classifies the state agency as "perhaps one of the weakest links in the
entire disability determination procedure" because personal examinations of the claimant
are not undertaken in most cases.
19 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 404.981 (1984). While the Appeals Council primarily reviews
the hearing, it will consider new evidence which is material to a disputed issue. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.976(b)(1984). See supra note 7 for a discussion of the scope of the federal court review.
20 See supra note 1 for the definition of "disability" as set forth in 42 U.S.C.
§ 432(d)(1)(A)(1982). The SSA regulations covering periodic reviews for continuing dis-
ability are contained in 20 C.YR. §§ 404.1588-.1598 (1984).
21 SENATE REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1277, 1307. The conference report details reasons for beth the incidence in benefit
recipients and decline in termination decisions. Much of this information was drawn from
Experience of Disabled Workers' Benefits Under OASDI, 1972-1976, AcTUARIAL STUDY No.
95 (June 1978)(reported in SENATE REP. No. 408). An underlying problem of significant
importance was the variance among different state agency determinations. The subjectivity
of the state decisions was a factor warranting consideration. While the overall incidence of
disability benefit awards may have increased markedly from 1968 to 1975, individual states'
figures were inconsistent.
2 SSA actuaries believed that healthier individuals were afforded continued benefits
although they were ineligible. A change in the definition of disability contributed to this
problem. The definition of disability in the 1965 Amendment granted benefits if the disab-
ling condition was expected to last at least 12 months; this change liberalized the past
definition which required permanent disability. Actuaries indicated the current definition
contributed to healthier individuals remaining on the disability rolls. SENATE REP. Na 408,
32, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1310.
23 SENATE REP. No. 408, 32, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1310.
The increase in disability caseloads forced the SSA to curtail some of its policing activities.
Prior to 1970, ten percent of the disability beneficiaries were subject to random investiga-
tions checking adherence to SSA guidelines. The magnitude of cases to be processed grew
from 1971-1974 leaving time and manpower to investigate only four percent of benefit
awards. Id.
24 SENATE REP. NO 408, 32, 36-37, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1310, 1314-15. The SSA concluded that the high benefit payments were a "formidible incen-
tive to maintain beneficiary status especially when the value of medicare and other benefits
are considered." Loss of benefits was viewed as deterring beneficiaries from attempting to
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
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Other factors also contributed to the increased number of disability
beneficiaries. Prior to 1972, the SSA reviewed a majority of the allowances
made by state agencies before such benefits were granted. 25 However, a
growing caseload coupled with cost and staff reductions prompted the
SSA to conduct random sample reviews involving only five percent of all
allowances.2 6 In contrast to the pre-1972 method, the state decisions were
examined only after benefits were awarded. Finally, the SSA credited
increased workloads, plus emphasis on expeditious processing of claims
with lowering the quality of decisions rendered. 27 This use of the phrase
"decline in quality" is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could refer to
actual carelessness by claims examiners because expeditious processing
was stressed. Alternatively, it could voice a general feeling by the SSA
that standards were too lax, thus accounting for the rise in benefit
recipients.
The concern over lack of uniform standards heightened, thus prompt-
ing congressional action. The SSA was given authority to formulate
guidelines for use by the states in making disability determinations.
State agencies were given the option of complying with the federal reg-
ulations or turning over administration of their disability program to the
SSA.28
Early SSA practices permitted termination of benefits without afford-
ing recipients prior notice or hearing. Such procedures were deemed by
one federal district court to violate due process;2 9 however, hearing by the
engage in trial work periods. The increase in benefit levels was attributed to wage growth in
the economy, since wages were a factor in formulas. However, when benefit levels were very
low a disabled person might continue working even if his impairment limited him to low
earnings, because such earning were still higher than benefit payments.
25 SENATE REP. No. 408, 52, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1330.
This review of state determinations provided some nationwide uniformity in benefit deci-
sions. The SSA was able to monitor the type of impairments deemed disabling as well as the
number of allowances granted by a particular state. If one state appeared to award a dispro-
portionate amount of benefits, the SSA could step in and review the procedures employed by
the state in question.
28 SENATE REP. Na 408, 52, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1330. A
random selection of five percent of all awards made at each level of the administrative
process, i.e., reconsideration, hearing, etc., are reviewed. These decisions may not ade-
quately reflect the criteria used by the states; in addition, they may not truly represent the
actual type and number of awards made by each state.
27 SENATE REP. No. 408, 52-53, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
1330-31. The questionable quality of decisions was also attributed to a lack of uniform
criteria among the various state agencies. Depending on one's state of residence, and even
the particular AWi assigned, similarly disabled persons could receive different decisions.
The report lists New Jersey as the leader in granting benefits on initial applications (53.1
percent) and Alabama as the least sympathetic to claimants (22.2 percent). Id. at 1331.
28 42 U.S.C.S. § 421(b)(1984). This provision outlines the procedure used by the SSA
both in reviewing and assuming the state agency functions.
29 Wright v. Finch, 321 F. Supp. 383, 386 (D.D.C. 1971). The court specifically held that
"[a] beneficiary must be given adequate notice and opportunity to participate in the deter-
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/13
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Supreme Court was avoided when the Secretary issued new regulations
providing that reviews could be conducted before cessation of benefits.30
The uniform procedures (also called "paper hearings") outlined in those
regulations are currently followed. They provide for advance notification
to a beneficiary advising him or her that a review of the file indicates
disability has ceased and benefits will be terminated. 31 The recipient then
has the opportunity to rebut such a finding by supplying additional medi-
cal evidence leading to a contrary conclusion.32 This evidence will be
considered and a final determination made; if the state agency deter-
mines that the recipient is no longer disabled, benefits will stop.
33
rnination of proceedings prior to suspension of benefits." Id. While the court determined that
formal hearings were not required prior to termination, it recommended that beneficiaries
be given time to supply evidence supporting their position. Furthermore, the court stated
that an impartial decision maker should resolve conflicting evidence rather than the investi-
gator who compiled the record. Id. at 386-87.
30 H. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 691, at 295. Since the regulations abolished the
summary adjudication and instituted procedures to be followed, the Supreme Court with-
held "judicial action pending reprocessing under the new regulations." Id.
31 20 C.F.R. § 404.1595(b)(1984). This section states:
We will give you a summary of the information we have. We will also tell you why
we have determined that you are not now disabled, and will give you a chance to
reply. If it is because of- (1) Medical reasons. The advance notice will tell you
what the medical information in your file shows; (2) Your work activity. The
advance notice will tell you what information we have about the work you are
doing or have done, and why this work shows that you are not disabled; or (3) Your
failure to give us information we need or do what we ask. The advance notice will
tell you what information we need and why we need it or what you have to do and
why.
Id.
I 32 20 C.YR. § 404.1595(c)(1984). Procedures for submitting evidence of disability are
set forth as follows:
If you agree with the advance notice, you do not need to take any action. If you
desire further information or disagree with what we have told you, you should
immediately write or telephone the State agency or the social security office that
gave you the advance notice or you may visit any social security office. If you
believe you are now disabled, you should tell us why. You may give us any addi-
tional or new information, including reports from your doctors, hospitals, employ-
ers or others, that you believe we should have. You should send these as soon as
possible to the local social security office that gave you the advance notice. We
consider 10 days to be enough time for you to tell us, although we will allow you
more time if you need it. You will have to ask for additional time beyond 10 days if
you need it.
Id.
3 20 C.F.R. § 404.1597 (1984). The regulation provides:
If we make a determination that you are not now disabled, your benefits will stop.
You will receive a formal written notice telling you why you are not disabled and
the month your benefits should stop. If your spouse and children are receiving
benefits on your Social Security number, we will also stop their benefits and tell
them why. The notices will also explain your right to reconsideration if you dis-
agree with our determination.
Id. After a cessation decision is rendered, the usual administrative remedies, i.e., recon-
sideration, hearing before an AUJ, etc., are available.
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1985
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The constitutionality of these so-called "paper hearings" was subse-
quently challenged in Mathews v. Eldridge.3 The Eldridge Court con-
cluded that the paper hearings comply with due process requirements,
thus rendering evidentiary hearings prior to termination of benefits un-
necessary.35 Three factors were considered by the court in examining the
due process challenge: 1) private interest affected; 2) erroneous depriva-
tion of interest through the procedures used; and 3) the government's
interest, especially the burden created by a change in procedure. 36 The
Court found that applicants were afforded an effective process for assert-
ing their claims prior to administrative action through the SSA's notifica-
tion of its tentative assessment on periodic review. In addition, the SSA
provided a summary of the relevant evidence that the claimant could
challenge. 37 The Court apparently believed this notice gave a claimant an
opportunity to tailor his or her rebuttal to the evidence the agency
deemed crucial for determination. However, the Court ignored the fact
that a claimant may not know the contents of such evidence, thus making
it nearly impossible for him or her to counter effectively the agency's
decision. The Court further held that a disability beneficiary's due process
rights were protected since administrative procedures provided for a right
to an evidentiary hearing after the termination of benefits, as well as
judicial review of the termination decision.38
Despite the Supreme Court's holding in Eldridge, subsequent amend-
ments to the Social Security Act created a pretermination hearing process
for cessation cases. The Virgin Island Source Income-Social Security Dis-
ability Benefit Appeal Act of 198239 provides for periodic review of cases at
424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Eldridge case raised considerations similar to those dis-
cussed in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). In Goldberg, the Supreme Court held that
the Due Process Clause of the fourteenth amendment entitled welfare recipients to oral
evidentiary hearings prior to termination of benefits. Goldberg invalidated the prior pro-
cedure which permitted termination of benefits without prior notification or hearing. A
similar procedure continued in terminating Social Security disability benefits and was
upheld in Eldridge.
35 424 U.S. at 349. The Court gave substantial deference to "the good-faith judgments
of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare programs"
in formulating agency procedures. Id.
6 Id. at 335. The Court ultimately found private interests were significantly affected,
although to a lesser degree than the welfare recipients in Goldberg. The Court concluded
that adequate procedural safeguards existed because much of the decision rested on medical
reports, supported by x-rays, and other objective evidence. Id. at 345. Finally, the court held
that the government's interest in conserving fiscal and administrative resources substan-
tially outweighed individual rights. Id. at 347-49.
37 Id. at 346. The recipient's notification listed information, generally medical reports,
which was employed by the agency in its decision making process. However, such letters
usually list the name of the physician and date of the report considered rather than specific
findings or diagnoses by the doctors.
3 Id. at 340.
39 See supra note 3 for the full text of the provision outlining the procedures to be
followed by state agencies.
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/13
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least once every three years. Should such review yield a finding of non-
disability, "any reconsideration... shall be made only after opportunity
for an evidentiary hearing ... which is reasonably accessible to such
individual. '40 The "hearings," in actuality, are conducted more as an in-
terview, although the disability claimant may have counsel in attendance
and present new evidence or witnesses. Such reviews are conducted by the
state agency after an individual files for reconsideration of a termination
decision. The reconsideration requests are filed with the claimant's local
Social Security office which then forwards the file to the disability deter-
mination agency. In addition, the claimant retains the option to continue
receiving benefits through the time of his or her hearing before an A_.
This review procedure, however, is limited to medical disability cessation
claims.
4 1
On its face, the reconsideration hearing process affords claimants bet-
ter opportunity to prove that they remain disabled; however, the benefits
may be illusory. Individuals now receiving disability undergo closer ex-
amination before their benefits are continued. This is true because their
disability status is checked more frequently (every three years) than the
past sporadic reviews. Furthermore, the SSA has tightened its disability
standards.
In contrast, the reconsideration process gives claimants the option to
continue receiving benefits during a portion of the appeals process. On
the surface, this appears to be a claimant-oriented provision; however, it
must be remembered that recovery of any overpaid benefits may be under-
taken in the event that a finding of "not disabled" becomes the final
decision of the Secretary.42 Thus, the policing of disability recipients pre-
viously alluded to in the legislative history to the 1980 Amendment43 was
put into practice.
1II. EVOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT STANDARD IN THE
COURTS
The Social Security Administration's accelerated review of disability
cases, coupled with its new policy of using current medical evidence as
basis for benefit terminations, accounted for the "Great Disability Disas-
40 Pub. L. No. 97-455, 96 Stat. 2497 (1982)(codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.). The reconsideration hearings outlined are limited to medical disability cessation
claims. Termination decisions may be based on other reasons. For example, substantial
earnings reported on a wage record or completion of a vocational rehabilitation program
may warrant cessation of benefits. Other examples are listed in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1590(b)(1984). Beneficiaries in these types of cases may appeal by "paper hearings,"
followed by the successive steps in the administrative process.
41 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(2)(1982).
42 Address by Leonard F. Herman, Director of R.S.C., Bureau of Disability Determina-
tion, Federal Bar Association, Cleveland Chapter Seminar (Oct. 26, 1984).
43 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.501-.515 (1984).
1985-861
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ter of 1981-1984." 44 Of the 1.2 million cases reviewed during that time,
491,000 recipients were cut from the rolls, although 215,000 have since
been reinstated and many remain at various stages in the appeals pro-
cess.45 As a result, judicial intervention became the norm as disability
appeals46 flooded the courts.
Early opinions focused discussion on the issue of which party should
bear the burden of proving continuing disability. Several courts presumed
that a claimant remained disabled, absent a showing of countervailing
evidence; similarly, other courts articulated specific standards requiring
medical improvement before benefits could be terminated.
A. Allocation of the Burden of Proof
In one of the first cases deciding the issue of which party must show
continuing disability, Marker v. Finch,47 the court held "the standards to
be applied by the court in reviewing a termination of benefits do not differ
materially from those applied in reviewing a denial of benefits." Similar
standards are used in evaluating both initial application and termination
cases; consequently, the court concluded that claimants have the burden
of proving disability in termination cases.49 When their cases are re-
viewed, beneficiaries must meet the same disability standards that were
in effect when their initial applications were filed. Since claimants had
the burden of proving disability in an initial entitlement case, the court's
logic dictated that they retain this burden on review.
In Miranda v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare,50 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals explained the difficulties associated with a strict
allocation of the burden of proof to one party:
It is true that one claiming benefits is sometimes described as
having the "burden of proof", meaning that he must furnish req-
uisite medical and other evidence within his grasp, . .. and show
reasonable diligence in maintaining his claim .... For his part,
however, the Secretary must make an investigation that is not
" SENATE REP. No. 48, see supra note 21, discussed in notes 24-26.
45 See supra note 10.
4 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), judicial review of a decision made by the Secretary is
appropriate when the issue is to determine whether the Secretary's decision is supported by
substantial evidence. These actions are filed in a federal district court.
47 322 F. Supp. 905 (D. Del. 1971).
" Id. at 909. The court's justification rested on the fact that disability benefits are not
paid continuously after the initial award to a claimant. A claimant would be subject to
ongoing review of his case. At the review, the case would be handled in the same manner as
an initial application.
49 Id. at 909-10. In termination and initial entitlement cases, the burden of proof is
allocated in the same manner.




wholly inadequate under the circumstances .... These respon-
sibilities resist translation into absolutes, especially because so-
cial security proceedings are not strictly adversarial. For this
reason we see no point in deciding abstractly whether the "burden
of proof' at a termination proceeding is on the claimant or the
Secretary. Both have responsibilities. 51
The sound reasoning of this analysis cannot be overstated. The court
intuitively recognized that both parties involved have an obligation to
insure a fair review of the benefit recipient's file. Since the ultimate issue
in cessation cases is whether the termination decision is supported by
substantial evidence, the parties' responsibilities for creating a complete
record on which to base the review becomes important. Both the claimant
and the Secretary should submit evidence bearing on the claimant's dis-
abled condition or lack thereof. The trier of fact may then render a deci-
sion based on a complete record.
Subsequently, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Torres v. Sch-
weiker,52 provided a persuasive rationale for "believ[ing] the view that the
burden of proof remains with the claimant in a termination case .... ,51
In support of its position the court first relied on Mathews v. Eldridge:5 4
"In order to establish initial and continued entitlement to disability bene-
fits a worker must demonstrate that he is [disabled]," and that, "[t]o
satisfy this test the worker bears a continuing burden of showing, by
[appropriate medical means], that he is disabled." 55 From this statement,
the Torres court concluded that the description of the termination pro-
cedures mandated allocation of the burden of proof to the claimant. Sec-
ondly, the court sought guidance from the statutory definition of dis-
ability which prohibited a finding of disability unless the claimant "fur-
nish[ed] such medical and other evidence . . . as the Secretary may
require."S The court reasoned that such language placed the burden of
proving medical disability squarely on the claimant.
51 Id. at 998 (citations omitted). Finding that both parties had the duty to submit
evidence supporting their respective positions, the Miranda court believed a fair adjudica-
tion was possible by determining whether the termination decision was supported by sub-
stantial evidence. In the context of a disability case, substantial evidence is defined as
evidence that "a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consol-
idated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
52 682 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1982).
53 Id. at 111. The court recognized that the AI., not the reviewing court, generally
determined which party has the burden of proof In this case, however, the ALJ did not
explicitly address that issue. Since the question of disability "might have turned on who had
the burden of proof' the court determined this issue was appropriate for their consideration.
424 U.S. 319 (1976); see supra notes 34-36.
55 424 U.S. at 336.
5 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(1982). In its entirety, this section provides that "ain individual
shall not be considered to be under a disability unless he furnishes such medical and other
evidence of the existence thereof as the Secretary may require."
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Finally, the court employed its earlier decision in Rossi v. Califano7 as
a framework for allocating the burden of proof in termination cases. Rossi
held that a claimant established his prima facie case of disability by
showing that he cannot return to his former work; the court, in Torres,
extended this standard to cessation cases. Proving inability to return to
one's past work, however, does not guarantee an award of disability bene-
fits; rather the claimant's age, education and work experience must be
considered in determining whether he can perform another type of job;
only if he is unable to perform another type ofjob is the claimant found to
be disabled.,8 The question of which party had the burden of introducing
evidence on this issue was not answered in Rossi. In Torres, however, the
court reasoned that "considerations of fairness and policy required that
the Secretary bear the risk of non-persuasion on the element of disability
on which the Secretary is in a better position than the claimant to intro-
duce evidence." 59 The court recognized that the Secretary, in comparison
to claimants, has both a greater financial base and more convenient ac-
cess to job availability information; this places the Secretary in a better
position to introduce such evidence. While the claimant continues to bear
the ultimate responsibility for proving disability, the burden of proof
shifts to the Secretary on the final issue of alternate jobs. The analysis of
the Torres court echoes the Miranda decision by recognizing that both
parties have obligations in disability proceedings.
B. Presumption of Continued Disability
The Miranda opinion noted that after the initial disability determina-
tion is made, there is a presumption of continued disability.6° The court
held that termination of benefits could be based either on current evi-
dence showing a claimant's improved condition, or on evidence that a
claimant's condition was not as severe as initially believed. However, in a
57 602 F.2d 55 (3d Cir. 1979).
w 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521(f)(1)(1984). This section states:
If you cannot do any work you have done in the past because you have a severe
impairment, we will consider your residual functional capacity and your age,
education, and past work experience to see if you can do other work. If you cannot,
we will find you disabled.
Id.
w 682 F.2d at 111-12. The court accepted the Rossi decision "[a]lthough the cases on
which Rossi relied do not appear to explain why the Secretary has the burden of showing
that the claimant 'has the capacity to perform specific jobs that exist in the national econ-
omy'." Id. at 111. However, the court noted that "information as to the availability of jobs in
the national economy is sophisticated information that most individuals do not have the
resources to prove or disprove" while such data is at the Secretary's disposal. Id.




footnote, the court rejected a past ruling that discouraged consideration of
evidence from a prior determination. Instead, the court stated that "it
would be wrong for the Secretary to terminate an earlier finding of dis-
ability on no basis other than his appraisal of the earlier evidence."6' This
statement gave presumptive effect to the earlier determination of dis-
ability. Following this rationale, a comparison of the current medical
evidence with that supporting the prior finding of disability is required
when a beneficiary's case is re-evaluated. The court's decision protects
claimants in two ways: first, a finding of disability could not be overturned
simply because the state agency concluded that the prior grant of benefits
was erroneous; second, the court hinted that benefits must continue if
medical improvement in the recipient's condition could not be established.
The court thus articulated a reasonable method for conducting continu-
ing disability reviews.
Once certain evidence establishes the existence of a disability, logic
dictates that the same evidence cannot also indicate nondisability. Courts
continued to rely on the Miranda analysis and once again the use of prior
evidence as the sole basis for overruling the previous determination was
struck down. In Simpson v. Schweiker,62 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held:
If, however, the evidence in a continuation case is substantially
the same as the evidence had been in the initial disability benefits
request case, benefits must be continued. Otherwise, termination
of benefits will often depend not on a finding of changed condition,
but simply on the whim of a changed AJ.63
The Simpson decision addressed valid concerns. The court recognized that
problems existed due to the lack of uniform standards for review and
noted that in all likelihood the party evaluating the case on review would
61 Id. at 998 n. *. The Miranda court refused to uphold the proposition that the Secre-
tary cannot take into account medical evidence considered earlier when the disability was
first established. See Pedroza v. Secretary, 382 F. Supp. 916 (D.P.R. 1974). Rather, the court
opined that the ALJ should "appropriately contrast the relative strength or weakness of
earlier medical evidence and relevant earlier events with claimant's current condition." 514
F.2d at 998 n. *. Accordingly, an individual could not be stricken from the disability rolls
unless evidence showing nondisability was submitted. Proof that the original impairment
was not as severe as initially believed was also sufficient to justify termination of benefits.
62 691 F.2d 966 (11th Cir. 1982).
63 Id. at 969. Such concerns were addressed by Congress in SENATE REP. No. 408, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1277, 1331. The commit-
tee report noted that reversals of state agency determinations varied among ALJs. From
January to March, 1979, 33 percent of the ALJs awarded claims to zero to 46 percent of the
cases they decided; 46 percent granted benefits to 46-65 percent of cases heard; and 21
percent awarded claims to 65 to 100 percent of the claimants who appeared before them.
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differ from the one who initially granted disability benefits. Additionally,
absent guidelines, ALJs were free to devise their own evaluation meth-
ods, and the prior disability determinations might not be considered.
Inequitable decisions clearly abound under such a system, especially
where existing disability definitions differ from those initially devel-
oped.6 Improved claimants whose cases were reviewed by sympathetic
ALJs may remain on the rolls; in contrast, truly disabled individuals may
lose benefits should their cases be reviewed by ALJs who refused to con-
sider previous evidence. The likelihood of this situation prompted the
Simpson court's second suggestion-that some effect be given to prior
disability determinations.
The trend toward giving presumptive effect to prior determinations was
followed in Patti v. Schweiker.65 In the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals, "all the presumption does is impose on the Secretary a burden
to come forward with evidence that the claimant's condition has
changed. '66 The court justified its position in this way: "A presumption, of
course, does not affect the ultimate burden of proof. It does, however,
impose 'on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption.' ' 67 Under such
reasoning, a claimant is still required to prove his case. Once disability
has been presumed, the claimant retains the burden of showing that his
condition remains disabling. Thus, evidence supporting continued dis-
ability must be supplied by the claimant, much like the procedure out-
lined in Torres. The Secretary then has the opportunity to rebut the
claimant's position.
In a subsequent decision, Kuzmin v. Schweiker,68 the Third Circuit
made an important distinction when discussing the presumptive effect
given a prior disability determination:
We make a distinction between the issue of the existence of a
medical condition and the issue of the existence of statutory dis-
ability. There is no policy reason to presume the continuation of a
medical condition. Since such conditions may and do change, no
consideration of administrative consistency is implicated. On the
other hand, the Secretary's prior determination that a particular
64 45 Fed. Reg. 55,566 (1980). This publication details updated regulations. Also con-
tained are policies followed by the SSA which were never codified as specific regulations.
Included were "other policies we [the SSA] have adopted based on our experiences in eval-
uating disability claims over many years." Id.
65 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
6 Id. at 587.
67 Id. (quoting FED. R. EviD. 301). The court was "unable to discern any reason" why
this principle could not be applied in disability benefit cases. Id.
- 714 F.2d 1233 (3d Cir. 1983).
[Vol. 34:145
14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/13
1985-86] MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT STANDARD
medical condition has resulted in a statutory disability does im-
plicate administrative consistency.69
Under this rationale, little effect is given to the fact that a claimant
continues to suffer from an impairment experienced at the time initial
benefits were first granted. If this condition originally met the statutory
definition of disability, however, presumptive effect is given and the claim-
ant is deemed to remain disabled. By recognizing the need for consistent
determinations, the Kuzmin court reinforced the call for uniform stan-
dards made by other courts. At the same time, the court assured that
some uniformity would prevail by its standard, at least until specific
regulations were promulgated by the Secretary.
Thus, the presumption of continued disability assured some degree of
uniformity in disability decisions. Specifying which party bore the bur-
den of proving continued disability eliminated confusion in the re-evalua-
tion process. The particular evidence needed to prove continued disability
was further demonstrated by the courts' development of medical improve-
ment standards.
C. The Medical Improvement Standard
The dispute over the medical improvement standard was prompted by a
change in the regulations issued by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services:
[W]e explain a new policy on when disability is considered to stop.
At one time, we would not find that disability or blindness had
stopped unless the medical evidence showed that the person's con-
dition had improved since we last determined that he or she was
disabled. About three years ago, we changed this policy and be-
gan to find that disability or blindness had stopped if we found, on
the basis of new evidence, that the person was not disabled or
blind as defined by law.70
This announcement indicated that the Secretary had previously relied on
an improvement standard, but such a policy had been abolished in favor of
basing the re-evaluation solely on evidence obtained at the time of the
periodic review. The new regulations made it clear that "disability ends
69 Id. at 1237. The court believed that a claimant would not be unduly burdened by
producing evidence that his condition remains unchanged; one claiming disability would
undoubtedly remain under some treatment or medical supervision. However, this rationale
ignores the plight of low-income beneficiaries who may not have regular physicians and may
receive treatment only infrequently. While many of these persons remain statutorily dis-
abled, they lack the requisite proof because their finances do not provide much leeway for
treatment.
70 Social Security Administration Final Rules, 45 Fed. Reg. 55,568 (1980)(to be codified
at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1579, 404.1586, 404.1594, and 416.994)(emphasis added).
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when current evidence shows that the individual is able to engage in
substantial gainful activity regardless of whether actual improvement
can be demonstrated."" The SSA's apparent disregard for its prior deter-
minations met with disfavor in the courts, especially in those courts
which had adopted the presumption of continuing disability rationale.
In Rush v. Secretary of Health Services, 2 the Eighth Circuit refused to
endorse the Secretary's new regulation; rather, it stated "[a]n agency's
interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference by the courts
... [however], an agency's interpretations are not conclusive and courts
are not bound by them. '73 The court concluded that the new regulations
"do not say what the Secretary says they mean. They do not even come
close to saying that a prior determination of disability may be disregarded
without any new evidence. 'T4
The Rush court further stressed that SSA policies were inconsistent as
a result of the new regulations:
We also note that the Secretary is entitled to rely on a prior
determination that a claimant is not disabled and, without hold-
ing a hearing, dismiss a second claim on the ground that it is
barred by the doctrine of res judicata .... We believe that a prior
determination that a claimant's condition is disabling should be
given similar preclusive effect to prevent the termination of bene-
fits solely on a reappraisal of the prior evidence. 75
The court's analysis clearly demonstrates that the SSA's refusal to give its
prior determinations presumptive effect was arbitrary. The new regula-
tion illustrated yet another problem created by a lack of uniform stan-
dards to determine disability. After a termination of benefits based on
current evidence, a claimant's only apparent safeguard was an appeal to a
71 Id. at 55,583. The Secretary stated that requiring a clear showing of improvement
"can result in the payment of benefits to persons who can engage in substantial gainful
activity and who are no longer disabled or blind within the meaning of the law." Id. The
Secretary continued:
The decision that a person's disability or blindness has ended will not be based on
a reexamination of old evidence but will be based on new evidence which will have
to reasonably show that the person is able to perform substantial gainful activity.
We do not agree that a finding that a person is disabled or blind should be allowed
to stand in the face of evidence to the contrary simply because of the lack of
evidence clearly showing medical improvement. We do not feel these regulations
are unfair and we believe that the requirements of these new regulations provide
adequate safeguards for persons who are still disabled or blind.
Id.
72 738 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1984).
73 Id. at 914 (citing Cunningham v. Than, 728 F.2d 1101, 1105 (8th Cir. 1984)).
74 738 F.2d at 914.
75 Id. The court continued, however, that it would enforce administrative res judicata




court with the hope that a sympathetic judge would give presumptive
effect to the prior disability determination.
Most courts recognized that the "medical improvement" and "presump-
tion of continued disability" standards are essentially identical.7 6 In fact,
"[t]he presumption of disability approach . . accomplishes the same
thing as an improvement standard ... [and] typically incorporates an
improvement standard .... Under either standard benefits may not be
terminated without showing that the recipient's medical condition has
improved. '7 7 Despite the similarities between the two standards, the cir-
cuit courts were divided over which one of these standards was
controlling.78
Circuits adopting the medical improvement standard concentrated at-
tention on the findings revealed by comparing prior and current medical
evidence. The significance of this comparison was first illustrated in Cas-
siday v. Schweiker:7 9
Given that the evidence continued to show the existence of the
same condition, and given that there was no question of improve-
ment ... we think Mrs. Cassiday made out a prima facie case and
the burden had shifted to the Secretary to justify the termination
of benefits.80
The court thus articulated a two-part standard requiring that the claim-
ant continue to suffer from the same condition as when he was first
declared disabled and that the evidence reveal improvement in this condi-
tion. This test was to be applied when comparing evidence from the prior
disability evaluation with that obtained at the time of the periodic review.
Rather than enunciate specific standards, several courts spoke of medi-
cal improvement in general terms. For example, in Hayes v. Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare,87 the Sixth Circuit determined that the
evidence did not "support the conclusion that termination of Hayes' bene-
76 Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 473 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
77 Trujillo v. Heckler, 569 F. Supp. 631, 635-36 (D. Colo. 1983).
78 Id. at 634-35. The opinion noted that the Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits adopted the medical improvement standard while the Fifth Circuit followed the
presumption of disability approach. The Holden decision stated that the Ninth and Fourth
Circuits adopted the presumption of continuing disability; it mentioned that the Eleventh
Circuit followed an improvement standard. 584 F. Supp. at 473. In a footnote, the Holden
court found that the Second Circuit "has neither rejected nor adopted the medical improve-
ment standard" while "no available opinion sets forth the views of the District of Columbia
Circuit on this question." Id. at 474 n. 8.
79 663 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1981).
80 Id. at 749. The court's reference to the claimant's lack of improvement became a
widely discussed factor in preventing termination of benefits; however, when read in the
context of the opinion it appears to be merely a passing reference.
81 656 F2d 204 (6th Cir. 1981).
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fits was proper because her condition had improved. 's2 The Fifth Circuit
required evidence "suggest[ing] that the condition has improved or that it
was not as serious as once thought."' Such decisions failed to define the
level of improvement necessary to support a termination decision.
Other courts, however, explained the concept of improvement. The Sec-
ond Circuit's decision in DeLeon v. Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices84 stated that a "comparative standard should be employed in
deciding whether to terminate an individual's benefits. If the claimant's
condition improves to the point where he or she is able to engage in
substantial gainful activity, benefits are no longer justified, and may be
terminated by the Secretary."85 In contrast to other circuits, the DeLeon
court required substantial evidence of improvement before benefits could
be terminated.86 A slight improvement in the recipient's condition would
not warrant cessation of benefits. According to this court's test, the Secre-
tary had to show sufficient recovery to the point that the claimant could
return to substantial gainful activity before he was deemed "improved."
The Eighth Circuit held that termination of benefits would be affirmed
"by showing that there was clear and specific error in the prior determina-
tion or by producing new evidence that the claimant's medical condition
has improved, that the claimant has benefitted from medical or vocational
therapy or technology, or that the claimant's condition is not so disabling
as originally supposed. 8 7 Under this standard, new evidence showing
improvement was required for cessation of benefits. Improvement could be
demonstrated specifically by participation in therapy or training or by a
conclusion that the prior finding was erroneous based on current medical
knowledge. Thus, the court provided some guidance as to the type of
evidence needed to show improvement.
Holden v. Heckler,ss a class action challenging the Secretary's standard
for terminating benefits, contained perhaps the most comprehensive defi-
nition of medical improvement. The Holden opinion required material
8 Id. at 206. The court did not elaborate on specific findings of improvement necessary
to prove the claimant's case.
83 Buckley v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1047, 1049 (5th Cir. 1984). The Buckley court held that
evidence of improvement was needed to rebut the presumption of continuing disability;
however, substantial evidence was not required to prove the claimant's disability had ceased.
Id. Presumably, any evidence was sufficient to disprove the claimant's disabled state.
84 734 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1984).
85 Id. at 937. The court also noted some ramifications associated with abolishing the
presumption of continued disability. Id. The court recognized that arbitrary decisions would
occur without some uniform standard; thus, it mandated application of the improvement
standard in cases where an individual was previously found disabled.
86 Id. at 936. See supra note 83 for the Fifth Circuit's view concerning evidence neces-
sary to rebut a prior determination.
11 Rush, 738 F.2d at 916.




medical improvement in a recipient's condition before benefits could be
terminated.
Material improvement means that in comparison to the last most
recent decision, the medically determinable physical or mental
impairment(s) which prevented the person from doing substan-
tial gainful activity and entitled the individual to disability bene-
fits has decreased to the point that the person can now perform
substantial gainful activity. This improvement must be demon-
strated by medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and
laboratory findings and must show positive changes in functional
abilities, symptoms or laboratory findings or that the effect of the
impairment(s) on the person has decreased.8"
Additional methods of demonstrating improvement were also outlined9o
From the Holden court's explicit definitions, both benefit recipients and
the Secretary were advised of the type of evidence necessary to support a
termination decision. Benefits could not be arbitrarily terminated based
on a conclusory statement that the claimant had improved; rather, objec-
tive medical evidence including laboratory findings and symptoms was
required to show improvement. The court also expanded the avenues
available for terminating benefits by including advancements in therapy,
improved diagnostic techniques, and vocational rehabilitation as accept-
able reasons. This decision clearly eliminated any ambiguities plaguing
the demonstration of improvement in a benefit recipient's condition.
Various medical improvement standards, both general and specific,
were adopted by the circuit courts for application in Social Security dis-
ability appeals. Such action, however, remained the claimant's sole rem-
edy. The SSA ignored the court decisions and continued to terminate
Id. at 494-95.
90 Id. at 495. Specifically, improvement may also be found when:
(a) New medical evidence shows that while an individual's underlying condition
may not have changed, advances in medical therapy or technology have re-
duced or eliminated the effect the condition had on the individual; or
(b) New or improved diagnostic techniques or other medical evaluations show that
an individual's previously determined medical condition is not as serious as it
was supposed to be at the time of the most recent prior determination; or
(c) New evidence shows that while an individual's underlying condition may not
have changed, the individual's vocational abilities have so improved through
education or training acquired up to the time of the most recent determination
of disability that he or she is able to engage in substantial gainful activity; or
(d) The individual has compensated or adjusted to the effects of his medical condi-
tion, resulting in the ability to engage in substantial gainful activity, or there
has been a change in prognosis.
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benefits based on current medical evidence alone.91 Congress finally took
action and included a medical improvement standard in the 1984 Amend-
ment to the Social Security Act.
IV. THE STATUTORY MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT STANDARD
The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 198492 was signed
into law on October 9, 1984.91 The initial purposes of the Act were three-
fold: 1) to clarify statutory guidelines for determination processes to in-
sure that no beneficiary loses benefits as a result of a careless or arbitrary
decision; 2) to provide more humane and understandable application and
appeal processes for disability applicants and those appealing termina-
tions; and 3) to standardize the policy making procedures and to conform
with standard practice of federal law, by requiring the Secretary to ad-
here to Federal Circuit Court of Appeal rulings.94 While it is questionable
whether these goals can be achieved, the amendment in its final form
does include a standard for reviewing the termination of disability
benefits.
The new medical improvement standard outlines seven situations in
which termination of disability benefits is justified:
(1) substantial evidence demonstrates that
(a) there has been any medical improvement in the in-
dividual's impairment or combination of impair-
ments [other than improvement not related to his or
her ability to work] and
(b) the individual is now able to engage in substantial
gainful activity (SGA); or
(2) substantial evidence, consisting of new medical evidence,
and a new assessment of RFC, demonstrates that al-
though there is no medical improvement
91 The SSA adopted a practice of "non-acquiescence" and continued to follow its own
policy regulations rather than circuit court decisions. In Hillhouse v. Harris, 547 F. Supp. 82,
92 (W.D. Ark. 1982), the court noted that the SSA was bound to follow the decisions of the
court of appeals unless or until they were reversed by the Supreme Court. While both the
House and Senate proposed amendments addressed non-acquiescence, no statutory provi-
sion was included in the 1984 Amendment. The joint committee urged the Secretary to seek
resolution of this issue in the Supreme Court. H.R. REP. No. 618,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-27,
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3038, 3059-63.
92 Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984)(codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
9 The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98
Stat. 3039 (to be codified at as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).




(a) a person has benefitted from advances in medical or
vocational therapy or technology relating to ability
to work, and
(b) the individual is now able to perform SGA; or
(3) substantial evidence demonstrates that although there is
no medical improvement
(a) the person has benefitted from vocational therapy,
and
(b) the individual can now perform SGA; or
(4) substantial evidence, based on new or improved diag-
nostic techniques or evaluations indicates that the per-
son's impairment or combination of impairments is not as
disabling as it was originally believed to be at the time of
the prior determination and that therefore the individual
is able to perform SGA; or
(5) substantial evidence contained in the file at the original
determination or new evidence shows that the prior deter-
mination was in error; or
(6) there is substantial evidence that the original decision
was fraudulently obtained; or
(7) the individual is currently engaged in SGA (except where
he or she is eligible under Section 1619), or fails without
good cause to cooperate in the review or follow prescribed
treatment or cannot be located.95
The first test permits termination of benefits if there is substantial
evidence demonstrating any medical improvement in the individual's im-
pairment and the person is now able to engage in substantial gainful
activity (SGA). This provision, however, poses several problems. Most sig-
nificantly, evidence showing any medical improvement appears to be ac-
ceptable to meet the first part of the test. Such language appears to
indicate that even a slight change in one's condition would sufficiently
signify improvement.
While providing that improvement must be shown by "substantial evi-
dence," 96 the amendment contains a loophole that is potentially harmful
to low-income beneficiaries. As noted, evidence from the prior determina-
tion must be compared to evidence currently obtained in order to demon-
strate improvement. Evidence supporting an initial determination
N' 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(f)(West Supp. 1985) sets forth the exact statutory language of the
medical improvement standard. This Note paraphrases the statute and will refer to the
amendment's text in summarized form.
Final rules governing SSA's interpretation of the medical improvement standard have
been published at 50 Fed. Reg. 50,118 (1985) and codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1579, 404.1586,
404.1594, and 416.994 (December 6, 1985).
96 See supra note 51 for the definition of substantial evidence.
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consists of any available hospital records, attending physician reports,
statements of the claimant, and consultative examination reports re-
quested by the SSA9 v If sufficient objective findings 8 establish disability,
benefits are awarded. Many low-income beneficiaries, however, do not
have regular physicians and receive infrequent treatment; thus, they
have little evidence substantiating their claim to present to SSA. In such
cases, claimants are referred to a physician employed by the agency for a
one-time consultative examination (CE) to assess disability.9M "CEs, how-
ever, frequently work to the detriment of a claimant and in no way are an
effective substitute for the testimony of a claimant's treating
physician. 100
The use of so-called "volume providers" (medical sources that perform a
large number of CEs)'0 ' to conduct CEs has drawn criticism concerning
the quality of examinations conducted. 10 2 Problems presented are the con-
sulting physician's inability to obtain an adequate medical history0 3 or
his concentration on one aspect of a claimant's condition. 10 4 Yet, these
examinations may provide an indigent claimant's only proof of whether
his condition has or has not improved.
Upon periodic review, if the beneficiary failed to provide evidence from
his own medical sources, he would be sent to a SSA physician for a
consultative examination. Despite the fact that the exam will include
objective measurements of the claimant's condition, a certain amount of
91 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1512 (1984)(detailing the claimant's responsibility to submit evi-
dence); § 404.1513 (listing acceptable sources of evidence); and § 404.1517 (explaining the
procedure and reasons for scheduling a consultative examination).
98 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(b)(1984). Objective findings include signs which can be observed
and laboratory findings such as clinical tests and x-rays. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1528(b),
(c)(1984).
99 20 C.F.R. § 404.1517 (1984). This section provides:
If your medical sources cannot give us sufficient medical evidence about your
impairment for us to determine whether you are disabled or blind, we may ask you
to have one or more physical or mental examinations or tests. We will pay for these
examinations. However, we will not pay for any medical examination arranged by
you or your representative without our advance approval. If we arrange for the
examination or test, we will give you reasonable notice of the date, time,and place
the examination or test will be given, and the name of the person who will do it.
We will also give the examiner any necessary background information about your
condition when your own physician will not be doing the examination or test.
Id.
100 Barber, Social Security Disability Hearings: Securing Additional Medical Evidence
for the Indigent Claimant, 37 AD. L. REV. 479, 485 (1985). This article details some of the
problems presented by employing consulting physicians to evaluate disability claimants.
101 UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE HRD-86-23, SSA CONSULATrWE
MEDICAL EXAMINATION PROCESS IMPROVED; SOME PROBLEMS REMAIN (1985) [hereinafter
cited as GAO/HRD-86-23].
102 Id. at 16.
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subjectivity may enter into the doctor's conclusion.O5 Thus, this doctor's
findings may indicate that the claimant's condition has improved from the
time of his last evaluation. According to the amendment, substantial
evidence of "any medical improvement" justifies termination of benefits.
Secondly, benefits can be terminated absent medical improvement if
new evidence demonstrates that the claimant "benefitted" from medical
or vocational therapy related to work ability. In addition, a present ability
to engage in SGA must be shown. This new evidence must include a
reassessment of the individual's residual functional capacity (RFC)'1 to
engage in work activities. The third section provides for termination of
benefits absent medical improvement if benefit from vocational therapy
and ability to perform SGA can be demonstrated. 107 The "benefit" derived
from successful completion of therapy is a greater work capacity by the
individual. Both sections disregard a claimant's lack of improved physical
condition, apparently assuming that the individual's participation in
some kind of therapy renders him fit to return to work. Neither provision
requires a showing of medical improvement in order for benefits to stop.
This provision actually discourages beneficiaries from seeking therapy
because the term "benefitted" is left open to interpretation-does it mean
mere participation in therapy? Or, will demonstration of a certain level of
105 A consulative examiner who derives a substantial annual income from SSA may be
more apt to want to please his employer. The Government Accounting Office study indicates
that volume providers' average gross income from CEs in the 1983 fiscal year was $348,672.
While 61 percent of the physicians received an annual income ranging from $100,000 to
$250,000 as a result of CEs, six volume providers earned over $1 million. GAO/HRD-86-23,
supra note 101, at 47.
106 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545 (1984). The term residual functional capacity is generally de-
fined as:
Your impairments may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what you
can do in a work setting. Your residual functional capacity is what you can still do
despite your limitations. If you have more than one impairment, we will consider
all of your impairments of which we are aware. We consider your capacity for
various functions as described in the following paragraphs; (b) physical abilities;
(c) mental impairments, and (d) other impairments. Residual functional capacity
is a medical assessment. However, it may include descriptions (even your own) of
limitations that go beyond the symptoms that are important in the diagnosis and
treatment of your medical condition. Observations of your work limitations in
addition to those usually made during formal medical examinations may also be
used. These descriptions and observations, when used, must be considered along
with the rest of your medical record to enable us to decide to what extent your
impairment keeps you from performing particular work activities. This assess-
ment of your remaining capacity for work is not a decision on whether you are
disabled, but is used as the basis for determining the particular types of work you
may be able to do despite your impairment. Then, using the guidelines in
§§ 404.1560 through 404.1569, your vocational background is considered along
with your residual functional capacity in arriving at a disability decision.
Id.
107 This section is not specifically included in either group of exceptions to medical
improvement as contained in the regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(d)(1985).
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skill be required? If the former, then any claimant who has participated
in some type of therapy may be stricken from the disability rolls since his
participation in a rehabilitation program could be deemed a "benefit of
advances in therapy."
The second test is particularly troublesome in that it permits a reas-
sessment of residual functional capacity (RFC) without a showing of
change in the beneficiary's condition. If the claimant's condition has not
improved, it is reasonable to conclude that RFC remains equally un-
changed. 1°8 Furthermore, the provision fails to state what type of "new
evidence" is required. Would a report discussing a continued impairment,
having findings as detailed as the prior evidence, and showing no im-
provement be considered "new evidence" simply because it is by a differ-
ent doctor (one unconnected with the prior determination)? Permitting
such a substitution of judgment would have a prejudicial impact on bene-
ficiaries' entitlement to continued benefits. In its present form, this am-
biguous provision supplies the basis for potentially unfounded and
arbitrary termination decisions.
The fourth situation allows termination of benefits where new or im-
proved diagnostic techniques indicate that the impairment is not as disab-
ling as believed at the time of the prior determination and that, therefore,
the claimant can perform SGA. The first three situations contained in the
standard are essentially two-part tests, requiring a showing of either
improvement or therapy and the present ability to engage in SGA. How-
ever, the ambiguous phrasing of the fourth section "and that therefore the
individual is able to perform SGA" leads to a different conclusion. This
section can be interpreted as meaning that, because heightened medical
awareness or knowledge discounts the prior finding, the individual is
deemed able to perform SGA. 109
However, the use of "new or improved techniques" may place claimants
at a disadvantage in meeting their burden of pfoving continuihg dis-
ability. For instance, in determining the severity of a back impairment,
SSA medical advisors place greater weight on the results of a myelogram
than on x-ray findings.""I Such internal policies are not published; conse-
108 The regulations specify that RFC is a medical assessment; consequently, a new RFC
seems unnecessary if the individual's medical condition has not improved.
109 The agency regulations require that even if the exception for new and improved
diagnostic techniques applies, a present ability to engage in SGA is also required. 50 Fed.
Reg. 50,118, 50,120 (December 6, 1985). The regulations, therefore, bring this test of medical
improvement in conformity with the others.
ll0 See 1 M. Hours, LAWYERS' GUIDE TO MEDICAL PROOF §§ 501.02, 502.01 (1984). In
discussing the diagnosis of conditions causing lumbar spine pain, this text states that "[n]o
x-ray diagnosis is possible unless [the] fundamental difference in density [of soft tissue in
the spinal cord] can be demonstrated on the x-ray film." Id. at § 502.01. Use of a myelogram
permits the soft tissue to be seen on the x-ray which in some cases may furnish the only
proof of a disabling back condition. Id. at § 502.12(10). Claimants are generally unaware of
this "evidence hierarchy," thus making their burden of proof almost impossible to meet.
[Vol. 34:145
24https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/13
1985-86] MEDICAL IMPROVEMENT STANDARD 169
quently, claimants do not know what the SSA considers to be "better
evidence." This hinders the ability of claimants to meet their burden of
proof Claimants may not supply results from a myelogram merely be-
cause they believe x-rays are sufficient objective findings to document
their impairment. SSA's internal policies generally are exempt from the
Administrative Procedure Act's rule-making procedures, which require
publication of proposed rules;' however, there is value in requiring the
publication of rules affecting substantial rights of claimants. A claimant's
ability to establish his prima facie case is hampered by the government
physicians' use of the unpublished "evidence hierarchy;" publication of
these policies would lessen their prejudicial impact on claimants. 1'
SSA final rules address this problem with respect to the agency's use of
new and improved diagnostic techniques to evaluate medical improve-
ments. 13 The regulations provide that a cumulative listing of changed
evaluative techniques since 1970 will be published in the Federal Register
and updated periodically. This practice will allow claimants to present
evidence of their disability by objective test results which SSA has spec-
ified as acceptable. While this listing may not curb SSA's tendency to
dismiss certain evidence favorable to claimants as unsatisfactory in view
of other evaluative methods which are available, claimants will be put on
notice as to SSA's expected course of action.
1 14
In order to stop benefits, the fifth provision requires a showing by prior
evidence or by new evidence that the prior award of benefits was er-
roneous. Using prior evidence contravenes the principle of res judicata,
which holds that a final decision on the merits of a case is conclusive as to
"I Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.S. § 553(a)(2)(Law. Co-op, 1980). This section
exempts matters relating to agency management or personnel, or to public property, loans,
grants, benefits or contracts from rule-making procedures. Since it is considered a benefit
program, SSA procedures would be exempt.
1"2 Rivera v. Patino, 524 F. Supp. 136, 148 (N.D. Cal. 1981). The court specifically held
that "[a]dministrative rules,... having a substantial impact upon private rights may not be
made without notice and comment procedures, even if the rule is exempt from Section 553."
113 20 C.F.R. § 404.1594(d)(2)(ii)(1985). This section states that information about new or
improved techniques will be provided in two ways: through changes in the techniques
required in the medical criteria listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of Pt. 404 or by publication
in the Federal Register.
11 An example of SSA's evidence hierarchy is demonstrated in Sec. 4.00G.4. Car-
diovascular System, 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (1985). The medical criteria
requires that treadmill exercise tests control over other evidence. Only if such tests are
unacceptable can other diagnostic tests be used to prove disability. Claimants having coro-
nary artery obstruction generally present cardiac catherization reports as evidence of their
condition. If the catherization report details findings equal to those listed in the medical
criteria of Appendix 1, the claimant should be found "disabled." However, in these cases,
SSA may order a treadmill exercise test and compare it to other medical criteria. Regardless
of the catherization results, the claimant may be found "not disabled" based on the exercise
test. This practice is prejudicial to certain claimants who meet the medical requirements for
disability based on the catherization, yet are denied benefits by virtue of the controlling
treadmill tests.
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the rights of the parties and constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent
action involving the same claim.1 ' The Secretary applies res judicata to
its prior denials of benefits and dismisses new applications alleging the
same disabilities that were previously denied."6 In the interest of consis-
tency, this principle should be equally applied to prior grants of benefits.
Keeping the original determination intact would not preclude termina-
tion of benefits; rather, the Secretary would be free to apply one of the
other tests contained in the new Act to prove the disability has ended.
The sixth test permits termination of benefits when substantial evi-
dence shows that the original decision was fraudulently obtained. The
final situation requires benefits to stop if the recipient is currently engag-
ing in SGA. These two provisions are justified; by scrutinizing cases on
review with these two factors in mind, SSA could eliminate abuses which
may plague the system.
In comparison to the medical improvement standards derived from case
law, this amendment most closely resembles the Holden standard." 7 The
legislative standard, however, contains one glaring omission. Despite ex-
tensive discussion by the courts, the amendment does not provide for a
presumption of continuing disability. Rather, the legislative standard of
proof provides that "any determination ... shall be made on the basis of
the weight of the evidence and on a neutral basis without any initial
inference as to the presence or absence of disability being drawn from the
fact that the individual has previously been determined to be disabled."" 8
The legislature intended for decisions to be made "on a basis which is as
nearly neutral as possible.""' 9
Congress "eliminate[d] any confusion that might result from shifting
burdens of proof' and concluded that "the claimant's obligations to estab-
lish the existence of his disability with regard to the CDI [continuing
disability investigation] proceeding are the same as his obligations with
regard to an initial determination.' 2 0 Congress placed the burden of proof
squarely on the claimant; however, the legislators ignored the fact that
the presumption of continued disability has the same effect. As noted, the
ultimate burden of proof is not affected by a presumption. Once disability
is presumed, the claimant continues to have the burden of showing that
he remains disabled. The only burden the Secretary must meet is to rebut
15 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1174 (5th ed. 1979).
116 20 C.F.R. § 404.957(c)(1)(1984). The SSA's arbitrary application of resjudicata was
discussed in Rush, 738 F2d at 914.
117 See supra notes 89-90.
11s 42 U.S.C. § 423(f)(1984)(emphasis added). This provision was phrased "to avoid any
misinterpretation with respect to the role of the claimant and the Secretary in pursuing
evidence or with respect to the non-adversarial nature of the proceeding." H. CoNF. REP. No.
1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 26, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3080, 3084.





the claimant's allegation of disability by showing that the claimant can
perform other jobs. Before the Secretary is required to show such evi-
dence, however, the claimant must have already met his burden of
proof.121
The enactment of a medical improvement standard is almost mean-
ingless in view of the loopholes created. Consider the following example:
A claimant's file comes up for a periodic review and he furnishes evidence
demonstrating that his condition remains unchanged since the time bene-
fits were initially awarded. Presumptive effect is not given to this prior
determination and despite the claimant's unchanged condition, a new
reviewer may conclude that the condition was never disabling; therefore,
the initial determination was erroneous and termination of benefits is
warranted. Conceivably, the claimant would be liable for repayment of
those benefits which were "erroneously" awarded. SSA could then begin
proceedings for recovery of the overpaid benefits. 2 This scenario is en-
tirely possible, especially in view of the medical improvement standard
provision that allows benefits to be terminated after a finding that the
original award was erroneously granted.
Congress's desire to abolish the presumption of continued disability
conflicts with basic principles of evidence. Presumptions are often used to
"tilt" the case in order to achieve certain social objectives.M' This aim
certainly fails in the case of the medical improvement standard. Congress
failed to include a presumption of disability in the interest of "neutrality."
This omission appears to allow a balanced review of the claimant's file; in
actuality, the case tilts in the SSA's favor. A presumption does not relieve
the party asserting it from the burden of proving his case; rather, it
"imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of going
forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption. 'u24
As applied to the medical improvement standard, a presumption that
the claimant remains disabled would not change the analysis. Upon re-
view, the claimant would be presumed disabled based on the decision
from his last review. He would be required to present evidence substan-
tiating the fact that his condition remains unchanged from that date. The
burden of proof would then shift to the SSA to rebut this conclusion. The
Secretary could apply the exceptions which it has codified from the stat-
utory standard at this stage.
In its present form, the entire continuing disability review procedure
creates a presumption of medical improvement which the claimant must
rebut. If SSA did not presume medical improvement over a period of time,
12 20 C.FR. §§ 404.1521(e),(f)(1984). These sections contain the final steps of the Secre-
tary's sequential analysis employed in evaluating a disability case.
122 SSA procedures covering overpayment of benefits are found at 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.501-404.515 (1985).
W' C. McCoRMcIK, EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972).
124 FED. R. EVID. 301.
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there would be no need for periodic reviews of claimants' disabilities and
benefits would be paid continuously. From its inception, therefore, the
medical improvement evaluation is not a neutral process. Claimants are
now subject to having the error exception applied to the previous dis-
ability determination which apparently is not conclusive. Presuming con-
tinued disability would balance the review rather than sway it in the
claimant's favor; this is desirable because the Social Security Act is re-
medial in nature and is to be liberally construed in favor of disability.'25
Some of the regulations governing implementation of the improvement
standard illustrate this presumption of improvement. One exception
deals with new or improved diagnostic techniques to show the individual's
impairment is not as disabling as previously believed. The provision
states that "improved methods for measuring and documenting the effect
of various impairments on the ability to do work" may serve as a basis for
finding that a claimant is no longer disabled. 26 The following example is
listed in the regulations:
The electrocardiographic exercise test has replaced the Master's
2-step test as a measurement of heart function since the time of
your last favorable medical decision. Current evidence could show
that your condition, which was previously evaluated based on the
Master's 2-step test, is not now as disabling as was previously
thought. If, taking all your current impairments into account, you
are now able to engage in gainful activity, this exception would be
used to find that you are no longer disabled even if medical im-
provement has not occurred.2 7
To accurately measure whether improvement has occurred, another
Master's 2-step test should be administered at the time of the periodic
review. By introducing "new and improved" techniques such as the EKG
into the analysis, the issue of improvement becomes clouded. The EKG
may indicate that the claimant has the RFC to perform a certain level of
work; under this exception, therefore, SSA would terminate the claim-
ant's benefits. Using two different measurement tools may not accurately
indicate improvement since it is akin to comparing apples and oranges.
Under the new regulation, SSA will view the EKG as controlling simply
because it is a "new or improved" evaluative technique. Acceptance of the
EKG because of its nature as an advanced diagnostic tool presumes a
claimant's condition is not as disabling as was previously believed. This
may not be true in all cases.
This flaw in the improvement standard will undoubtedly lead to exten-
sive litigation that could have been prevented by retaining the presump-
'm' Williams v. Califano, 590 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1979); Miles v. Celebrezze, 233 F. Suppl
767 (W.D.S.C. 1964).





tion of disability. In so doing, the claimant would need to prove his
condition persists to the point that he continues to be incapable of doing
his former job. The Secretary could then rebut the presumption by apply-
ing the medical improvement exceptions. Since these exceptions require
improvement or therapy and the ability to engage in SGA, the Secretary's
burden would remain essentially unchanged.2s
V. CONCLUSION
Including a medical improvement standard in the 1984 amendment to
the Social Security Act was viewed by Congress as a panacea to the
confusion created by massive termination of disability benefits upon peri-
odic reviews. The threat of arbitrary termination decisions had long
plagued the Social Security disability system due to the lack of uniform
guidelines for reviewing continuing disability cases. The medical im-
provement standard outlines much-needed criteria for use in conducting
periodic re-evaluations of disability recipients; yet, the newly-enacted
standard has the potential for creating additional problems.
The improvement standards developed in the courts specifically allo-
cated the burden of proof between the parties. Despite the fact that claim-
ants retained the ultimate burden of proving their continued disability,
beneficiaries were presumed to remain disabled unless the Secretary in-
troduced evidence to the contrary. Citing neutrality in decision-making
as a goal, Congress eliminated the presumption of continued disability
from the amendment. Absent this presumption, problems with the bur-
den of proof remain.
As a result, a claimant's prima facie case is more difficult to establish,
especially in view of certain phrasing used in portions of the standard.
Substantial evidence demonstrating any improvement may disprove the
claimant's position. On the surface, this level of evidence appears ade-
quate to contradict a claim of continued disability; however, it must be
remembered that substantial evidence requires only "more than a mere
scintilla."'2 9 Thus, substantial evidence does not even approach the
weight of evidence which the claimant is required to present. 30 The
amendment apparently requires very little evidence to demonstrate im-
provement and justify the termination of benefits.
In addition to problems with the burden of proof, eliminating the pre-
sumption of continued disability apparently permits the Secretary to ter-
128 See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. The Secretary's burden of proof is to
demonstrate that the claimant can engage in some type of work existing in substantial
numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f)(1985).
m Consolidated Edison v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
130 See supra note 51. Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla" but less than
a preponderance of evidence. However, a claimant must continue to prove his case by a
preponderance, which makes his burden greater than that of the Secretary.
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minate benefits by deeming the prior conclusion erroneous. As a result,
the Secretary's inconsistent policy of applying the doctrine of resjudicata
only to his own prior benefit denials is impliedly endorsed.
In its present form, the medical improvement standard is a mixed
blessing. It provides a much-needed definition of the term "medical im-
provement" that can be employed by the Secretary when conducting peri-
odic reviews. The standard clearly provides the guidance that the prior
system lacked. On the other hand, problems still abound. The elimina-
tion of the presumption of disability forces claimants to prove their case
far beyond a preponderance of the evidence while the Secretary's rebuttal
may be structured in terms of substantial evidence. While claimants may
have initially believed that the enactment of a medical improvement stan-
dard was a victory, they must become aware of the pitfalls it contains.
The medical improvement standard ensures beneficiaries that there is
some measure of consistency in the periodic review process. Until newly-
enacted regulations are actually applied to termination cases, the courts
can enjoy a somewhat lightened docket; at least until the next onslaught
of cases challenging the Secretary's interpretation of the medical im-
provement standard.
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[Vol. 34:145
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol34/iss1/13
